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A first impression upon reading the title to this paper might be "Is there much to say
about this topic that we don't already know?"  Maybe not, we will let the reader decide after
reading further.  Certainly it is common knowledge that finance is an integral part of management
as described by most business management and recent farm management textbooks.  We have
come a long way from the days when the most sophisticated approaches to including finance in
farm management analyses were incorporating capital constraints and credit activities in farm firm
linear programming models.  In fact, some of the more recent advances in modeling and
understanding farm firm behavior, particularly with respect to considerations of risks, have come
from those in the profession with a finance orientation.
So, what is new?  Our goals in this discussion are modest.  We will introduce and/or
review two theoretical concepts that are not new, but, in our judgement, have been under-utilized
in farm and financial management research.  We then will discuss two topic areas that could use
these and other concepts and merit further analyses.  Our goal is simple: to stimulate further
dialogue so that the frontiers of the interface between farm and financial management can be
pushed out further.
Theoretical Constructs
Two theoretical constructs will be reviewed briefly: (1) the integration of production
theory and financial theory as proposed by Vickers and applied to farm firms by Lowenberg-
DeBoer and Lowenberg-DeBoer and Boehlje; and (2) the balancing of business risk and financial
risk as suggested by Gabriel and Baker, among others.4
Integrating Production and Financial Theory
A theoretical model that encompasses a number of the characteristics of the modern
production environment for the farm firm is summarized in the following set of equations.  Ideally,
the model should maximize expected utility considering price, production, and financial risks.  This
approach has been used elsewhere with a specific focus on survival (Robison and Lev).  The
approach used here is a simpler lexicographic model which maximizes the expected value of the
firm subject to a probabilistic constraint on firm continuance.
As suggested by Vickers, the entrepreneur is assumed to maximize wealth, which can
be stated as:















where V is the expected value of the firm, E[ ] is the expected annual stream of income and p
capital gain, and p is the capitalization rate.  The expected annual stream of income and capital
gain is specific as:
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where P is a vector of output prices; X denotes nondurable inputs or products that contribute to
production and are consumed or sold during the production period; L denotes durable inputs that
contribute to production over time and may increase (decrease) in value, resulting in capital gains5
(losses); f(X, L) is a strictly concave multiproduct 
production function with fX, fL > 0, f"X, f"L < 0 for all products;
and   are the vectors of the cash prices of inputs X and L, respectively (the price of g1 g 2
nondurable inputs is easily determined; the price of durable inputs is calculated as the annualized
cost of the services rendered and is frequently estimated as the explicit or implicit rental cost per
unit of service); D is debt funds used to finance the production process; K is 
equity funds; r  is the debt supply function with r' > 0 and r" > 0;   is the average tax rate; *1 ( )
D
K t
and *2 are the rate of capital gain or loss on nondurable and durable inputs; N1 and N2 are the
portion of unrealized capital gain or loss on nondurable and durable inputs substitutable for
income.  The formulation of equation (2) does not explicitly recognize the differential taxation of
capital gains compared to ordinary income, although such a distinction has been accommodated
elsewhere (Lowenberg-DeBoer).
As Vickers specifies, the capitalization rate is a function of firm size and financial
leverage:                      
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where a is a constant,   is the firm size parameter of the capitalization rate function, and   is q1 q2
the leverage parameter of the capitalization rate function.  The specification of equation (3)
recognizes that as firm size increases, the marginal productivity of capital and thus the
capitalization rate declines, but that increased leverage and thus higher financial risk results in an
increase in the capitalization rate.6
The value of the firm is maximized subject to the financing and survival constraints.  The
financing constraint is specified as:
(4)  K + D - "X - ßL $ 0
where " and ß are the amount of financial capital absorbed in the acquisition of the nondurable and
durable inputs, respectively.  These parameters may not be equal to the purchase price of the input
if special financing arrangements reduce the capital absorbed in the acquisition process.  For
example, leasing arrangements or concessionary financing used as a sales tool by farm equipment
manufacturers can reduce the capital required to acquire such equipment.  Equation (4) indicates
that the acquisition of inputs requires and is constrained by the availability of equity (K) and debt
(D) capital.  Equity capital is comprised of proprietor's contributions and retained earnings, as well
as equity funds contributed by outside investors.  Thus, the equity capital base is not presumed to
be constant since the entrepreneur's equity can be augmented with outside equity.
The final constraint is a liquidity or survival constraint.  It recognizes that assets have
a net cash flow and/or a liquidity component that can be used to meet the firm's minimum
requirement for cash.  Given the uncertainty associated with the cash and the liquidity components,
this is specified as a constraint which must be met with a specified probability:
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where   and   are the after-tax liquidity coefficients per dollar of nondurable and durable l1 l2
inputs, respectively;   and   are the amounts of nondurable and durable inputs, respectively, $ X $ L
remaining at the end of the annual production cycle; F is principal payments on debt, C is operator
withdrawals, and Z is the minimum probability with which the constraint must be met.  The after-
tax liquidity coefficients can be viewed as one minus the percentage liquidation losses for each
input.
Equation (5) might be termed the "survival function."  It reflects the cash flow
requirements that the firm must meet to continue in business.  Typically, production inputs and
capital assets contribute cash earnings, while others, such as stored grain awaiting sale, commonly
contribute cash through liquidation.  However, the constraint recognizes that durable and
nondurable inputs can be liquidated to meet cash needs, even though such sales are expected to
significantly impair the long run income-generating capacity of the firm.  The formulation specified
here assumes that assets are liquidated only at the end of the production cycle; however, such an
assumption is not essential if the model included a more detailed time specification. 
The decision variables in the model include nondurable inputs (X), durable inputs (L),
debt (D), and equity (K).  The multiproduct nature of the production function [f(X, L)] implies
that the optimal values of these decision variables will result in an optimal product mix as well as
an optimal size of farm.8
The comparative static properties of this model are complex to develop analytically,
particularly given the probabilistic nature of the survival constraint (equation (5)).  Lowenberg-
DeBoer has derived comparative static properties for the model excluding the survival function.
As a step in the development of a more general model, the discussion here will draw upon and
augment that earlier work by examining the implications of adding the survival function to the
model.
The implications of this integrated model for optimal input use and product mix are
significant.  Lowenberg-DeBoer indicates that ignoring the survival constraint, the optimal mix of
durable and nondurable inputs is not only a function of the relative prices
(  and   ), but also the finance charge coefficients (  and  ) and the capital gains parameters g1 g 2 a b
(N1  and N2 ).  Using his approach, the marginal rate of input substitution is defined as: d1 d2
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where fX/fL denotes the ratio of marginal products of durable for nondurable inputs.
As is typical of the Vicker's formulation, the marginal rate of substitution is equal to a
factor or input cost ratio which includes after-tax relative input prices, plus relative "finance
charges."  These relative finance charges reflect the interest payments on funds borrowed to buy
the inputs, as well as the implicit or explicit collateral constraints imposed by lenders, as reflected
in specific lending limits that restrict the use of credit in acquiring various inputs.  Because these
lender-imposed collateral and funding constraints are more a function of cash flow and the liquidity9
characteristics of various inputs rather than relative prices, it is typically the case that the relative
finance charges will not be equal to relative input prices.
Unlike the usual Vicker's model, the input cost ratio also includes an argument reflecting
differential capital gains or losses on durable and nondurable inputs.  Typically, capital gains or
losses on durable inputs will exceed those on nondurables; in fact, the capital gains or losses for
nondurables will frequently be zero.  Assuming that capital gains on nondurables are zero (  = d1
0), but that capital gains on durables are positive (  > 0) and that part of these gains are d2
substitutable for current income (N2 > 0), the capital gains will tend to off-set part of the cost of
acquiring the durable inputs.  Capital losses would have the opposite affect; they would tend to
increase the cost of durable inputs.  Thus, the optimal input mix is not only a function of relative
factor prices, but also relative finance charges and relative capital gains or losses.  This clearly
impacts the structure of the firm.
The recognition of capital gains and losses and finance charges will also have an impact
on the choice of outputs.  Lowenberg-DeBoer introduces two production functions [g(X, L) and
f(X, L)] into the model; when input prices are the same for both enterprises, the marginal rate of
substitution equation is as follows:
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Both the marginal rate of substitution for the f production function (MRSf) and marginal rate of
substitution for the g production function (MRSg) will be larger than is traditionally the case10
because of the presence of capital gains on durable inputs.  But, if one production function has a
lower marginal product of durable inputs than the other, the output and use of durables in the
production of that commodity will be curtailed.  For instance, assume g describes the production
of fruit and vegetables such that at some relatively small amount of land gL becomes small
compared to gX.  That is, the marginal product of land becomes small compared to the marginal
product of other inputs such as fertilizer, labor, pesticides, etc.  Assume f describes the production
of grain; the marginal product of land in grain production can remain relatively high even if a
substantial amount of land is already in use.  Under these conditions, MRSg would be equal to the
input-cost ratio at some low level of land input, but a much larger level of land input would be
required to equate MRSf and the factor-cost ratio.
As capital gains increase, the input cost ratio increases and the output which lends itself
to land-extensive production assumes a larger share of the output mix.  It may be the case for some
levels of capital gain and some production functions that the land input for g must be made so
small to achieve equality (7) that the production of output g drops to zero.  It should be noted that
this does not suggest that the most land-extensive output is always favored.  Rather, it indicates
that the favored output in the presence of capital gains is one in which the production process is
relatively land-extensive and the marginal product of land remains relatively high even when the
firm uses large amounts of land.  For capital losses, the opposite effect occurs and enterprise
choice tends toward land-intensive options.  The size and structural implications are, again,
apparent.
The discussion thus far has not recognized the impact of liquidity and cash flow11
differences in the choice of optimal durable and nondurable input use as encompassed in the
survival function of equation (5).  If the lender's perception of cash flow and liquidity
characteristics of durable and nondurable inputs, as reflected in the  finance charges, are an
accurate reflection of the actual values of these coefficients as experienced by the farmer, then
explicit recognition of these characteristics, as in equation (5), will have little impact on the optimal
input mix.  However, if cash flow and liquidity characteristics, as actually faced by the farmer,
differ from those of the lender, then the addition of these parameters will influence optimal input
use.  Specifically, nondurable inputs are typically more liquid and generate more cash flow on a
per unit basis than durable inputs, which would suggest a larger quantity of nondurable inputs in
the optimal input mix.
With respect to investment behavior, the optimal mix of durable and nondurable inputs,
as well as the optimal type of durable input to acquire, is influenced by the net income, net cash
flow, capital gains, collateral value, and liquidity parameters in the fashion noted earlier.  The
disinvestment behavior, as noted elsewhere (Boehlje and Eidman), is a function of the same
parameters; the owner would prefer to sell those assets that possess the characteristics of high
liquidity, low net income and cash flow, low capital gains, and limited collateral value.
Ignoring the survival constraint, the financial structure of the firm can be characterized
by solving the first-order conditions for equity and debt to yield an expression in the discount rate
and leverage ratio as:
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The left-hand side of this equation is the marginal cost of equity capital.  The right-hand side is the12
marginal cost of debt capital, which generates the common financial result that, in the optimal
financial structure, the marginal cost of all sources of capital are equal.  Lowenberg-DeBoer
indicates that, if equity is not fixed, capital gains and losses do not affect the financial structure or
the optimal debt-equity mix.  However, if equity is fixed, the optimal use of debt must be found
simultaneously with input levels.  The result in this case is that capital gains or losses do impact
debt utilization; debt use increases (decreases) with higher levels of capital gains (capital losses).
In a more detailed specification of the model, D may be a vector of debt with various
maturity and principal repayment characteristics.  The optimal composition of debt is then a
function of the cost of each debt source and its impact on the survival constraint through the debt
servicing requirements.  If debt servicing requirements are higher for short-term, compared to
long-term debt (because of higher interest rates and larger scheduled principal reductions), the
optimal debt composition will include a larger quantity of long-term and a smaller quantity of
short-term (current) debt.  Equation (5) also suggests that, because of relative liquidity and cash
flow characteristics as noted earlier, an input mix that contains a higher proportion of nondurable
inputs will improve the probability of survival.  Clearly, lower levels of withdrawal and the
substitution of entrepreneurial and investor equity for debt will reduce the cash requirements for
debt servicing and also increase the probability of survival.
In summary, the implications of incorporating capital gains or losses and finance charges
(including liquidity and collateral coefficients) in the analysis for the use of durable and nondurable
inputs and structure and organization of the farm firm are important.  Since real estate is the most
important durable input used in13
most farming operations, the farm size implications are also significant.  In essence, the larger the
capital gain on durable inputs (for example, the land price increase) or the smaller the finance
charges--all other parameters constant--the greater the optimal use of durable inputs (farmland).
Use of nondurable inputs
is reduced if capital gains on durable inputs are larger or the fraction of capital gains substitutable
for current income is greater.  Capital losses and higher finance charges have the opposite effect:
they tend to increase the cost of durables (land), reducing the factor or input-cost ratio and hence
reducing the use of durables (land) in the optimal solution while increasing use of nondurable
inputs.  Thus, in an environment of capital losses or higher relative finance charges, the decision
maker would tend to economize on durables (land) to avoid those losses or costs.
With specific reference to capital gains or losses, it is important to separate the effects
of the price level of durable inputs compared to the rate of change in durables prices.  If the price
of durable inputs is higher, the annualized cost of durable ownership will be higher; there will be
a tendency to use fewer durables.  The price change in durables can, however, either off-set or add
to the cost of owning durable inputs, depending upon whether the price is rising or falling.
The analytical results suggest that at least part of the
increase in the use of durable inputs and average farm size in the United States during the three
decades prior to the 1980s may be a result of the almost continuous capital gains that occurred.
It also indicates that, all other things being equal, if capital gains during the period had been
smaller or if those gains had been less substitutable for wealth, farmers would have invested in
more nondurable inputs such as labor, fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seed.14
The analysis also suggests that farm size and the use of nondurable and durable inputs
can be significantly affected by government policy.  For instance, it is frequently argued that land
prices are the capitalized value of expected future income from land ownership.  If this expected
future income is rising, capital gains are likely to occur.  If a price support program increases the
rate at which future income from land is expected to rise, the analysis suggests that there will be
a tendency for farm size to increase and for land use to become more extensive.  Conversely, a
weakening of government price support commitments, which reduces income expectations and
results in a lower rate of land price change, would tend to reduce the optimal farm size and
encourage more intensive farming.  Government tax and credit policies that have a differential
impact on income, capital gains and finance charge coefficients for durable and nondurable inputs
will impact the optimal input mix in like fashion.
Risk Balancing
Gabriel and Baker (1980) and Barry (1983) have developed useful frameworks to link
production, investment, and financing decisions by use of a risk constraint.  Their methods differ
mainly in how business risk and financial risk are combined to determine total risk.  Gabriel and
Baker combine business risk (BR) and financial risk (FR) in an additive manner to calculate total
risk (TR).  Barry combines BR and FR in a multiplicative manner to determine TR:
(9)  TR = (BR) * (FR)
Barry (p. 120) expresses total risk as the coefficient of variation for equity holders:15
(10)     TR
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where   is the standard deviation and   is the expected returns for d r
equity (e) or risky assets (a); id is the interest rate on debt;
Pa and Pd are the proportions of risky assets and debt, respectively.  Business risk is the coefficient
of variation for risky assets:









and financial risk is the result of dividing total risk by business risk:
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Either Barry's multiplicative relationship or Gabriel and Baker's
additive relationship could be used in an objective function to minimize risk.  Also, if a farmer's
risk attitude could be measured,
a risk constraint could be placed in an optimization problem such as is done in the Vickers model
earlier in this paper.
Alternatively, since risk attitudes are not known with accuracy, the representative farm
approach to prescriptive analysis could be expanded to include the trade-offs between profit and
risk levels under different financing schemes.  Results could be presented in a similar manner as16
business risk alternatives are presented in some programs.  In this use, the farmer, who is assumed
to be concerned with total risk only, could see the impact of different alternatives in business size,
structure, and operation and the interaction of financing alternatives.
This framework of describing total risk as a combination of business and financial risk
allows us to see the process of how a manager or owner of assets will balance or trade one type
of risk for another.  Thus, we can see how a farmer (i.e., an equity holder) may finance a business
differently for one set of enterprises with a higher business risk compared to a set of enterprises
with a lower business risk.  The effects of exogenous forces such as the impact of world market
conditions on commodity prices or macroeconomic policy on interest rates on either business risk
or financial risk can also be seen.
With a few exceptions, this framework has not been utilized as fully as it could be.  As
farm firms become more exposed to business risk and more dependent on debt capital and thus
encounter increased financial risk, the concept of risk balancing becomes more important.
Pederson and Bertelsen incorporate business and financial risk in their analysis by including both
different enterprise choices and different financing instruments (i.e., ownership of land or share-
renting land).  Collins and Barry present a very useful approach to farm planning using a single-
index portfolio model, but different financing options are not included; risk balancing is not
endogenous.  Atwood, Watts, and Helmers present a chance-constrained programming
model of the farm financing decision but only one financing option was included.
These last two studies are cited, not to be critical of their inadequacies, but to show that
the concept of risk balancing could be added with relative ease to many existing models.  Future
efforts could include both business and financing activities within the same model.  Alternative17
business activities would include different enterprises and investments.  As will be discussed later,
alternative financing activities should include ownership, leasing, renting, and debt with different
financial terms.  By including both of these types of activities, a model could link production,
marketing, and financing decisions and analyze the impacts of changes in not only the riskiness of
ventures, but also the impact of differing levels of risk aversion.
Researchable Issues
In this section, we focus our attention on two basic areas which we feel merit additional
emphasis in the farm and financial management research agenda: (1) resource control and use, and
(2) financial measurement and control.
Resource Control and Use
The topic of resource control and utilization is at the core of farm and financial
management, but the research focus in the past has been relatively narrow.  Much of the past
research has been on optimal investment strategies with special consideration for what assets to
purchase and how to obtain adequate debt and equity funds to finance the purchases.
Ownership is one method of obtaining the control and the rights to use productive assets.
But there are other methods including leasing.  There has been some work done on renting and
leasing, particularly of real estate, but the emphasis has been on evaluating traditional cash or crop
share leases and the implications of such leasing strategies for optimal resource allocation
(Pederson and Bertelsen; Apland et al.; Pederson; Perry et al.).  Alternative real estate leasing
arrangements which include variable payments as a function of commodity yields or prices are18
discussed in extension programs, but have received little research attention.  The implications of
different lease terms (e.g. multiperiod lease arrangements; sharing of outlays for and benefits of
the permanent improvements; and the sharing of costs, risks, and responsibilities for soil erosion
and environmental degradation) merit further analysis.  The optimal strategy and terms to obtain
control of real estate over time through purchase and lease options for different interest, tax,
inflation, appreciation and earnings rates are also of interest.
Leasing of other capital assets (e.g., machinery, equipment, buildings, and breeding
stock) has not been particularly popular in agriculture, but may have more potential than we now
perceive.  An interesting question is, "Why is leasing used more frequently in the business sector
generally, and increasingly, for personal as well as corporate automobiles and trucks as compared
to the agricultural sector?"  More generally, the costs and benefits of diversified financing, such
as using the optimal mix of farm and nonfarm equity; debt with various rates, terms, and repayment
characteristics; and various forms of real estate and capital asset leasing arrangements, are worthy
of detailed investigation.
But studies of the merits and problems of ownership and leasing would not adequately
exhaust the options available for resource control.  Some farmers obtain certain machine services
by exchanging labor or other machine services for them.  Various schemes for joint ownership of
"extra" power or harvesting capacity to obtain timeliness benefits without incurring excessive costs
have been discussed.  One such scheme is to have "extra" capacity jointly owned by geographically
dispersed farmers who are not subject to the same rainfall pattern and who bid for the use of the
"extra" capacity on a weekly or daily basis.  Acquiring machine services through "custom hire"19
(whether for individual activities such as harvesting or for the full set of cropping activities, such
as with custom farming) is increasingly popular in some geographic regions.  Budgeting analysis
suggests that custom farming is frequently a lower cost cropping alternative for a landowner than
cash or crop share renting.  One possible explanation is that the hourly return for labor is typically
relatively low in crop production and that custom operators frequently price their services based
on marginal costs and cash flow needs, which are typically lower than the full costs of machine
ownership.  Rigorous analysis of this and/or other possible explanations for custom farming and
machine sharing and the potential role of these less traditional methods of resource control would
be of interest.
A parallel in the livestock sector to the leasing and custom farming options in crop
production is custom feeding and contract production.  Limited research has been done on the
optimal strategy for a cattle feeder or hog producer with livestock facilities with respect to owning
the livestock fed in those facilities, custom feeding in those facilities, or feeding livestock in
someone else's custom feedlot.  In some circumstances, the optimal strategy may include a
combination of all three options.
Contract production has become increasingly important in the swine industry.  Resource
providing contracts where the contractor supplies important inputs, such as feed or feeder pigs,
appear to be of the most interest.  They can assume various subforms that vary in the costs and
risks shared by contractors and producers.  The farmer may find contracting attractive because it
provides him with expensive inputs, utilizes his facilities and technical skills, and assures him a
reasonable return.  The reduced risk with contract production may be a major advantage when the20
producer is negotiating with a lender to borrow funds for expansion or new facilities.  In fact,
some resource providing production contracts are not all that different than leasing arrangements
in terms of the cash flow and financing implications for the farm business.  Yet, we know little
about the terms and conditions of this method of resource control and use and where it fits into
the optimal farm and financial management strategy.
Undoubtedly, using some of these nontraditional (as well as the traditional) means of
acquiring control of resources will impact the structure of the farming sector: including the size
distribution of farms, the level of specialization or diversification, resource ownership and
financing patterns, and the inter- and intra-sector linkages, including horizontal and vertical
integration (Boehlje).  Use of the concepts of the integrated production and financial model and
the balancing of business and financial risk discussed earlier may help us understand these
structural implications as well as the optimal strategies for resource control for individual firms.
Financial Measurement and Control
Within the farm management literature, the three basic functions of management (i.e.,
planning, implementing, and controlling) have received different emphasis.  Planning is the most
discussed, implementing is the most neglected, and, until recent texts, controlling was the most
misdirected.  Controlling had been discussed only as financial control or, even more specifically,
only as "keeping the books."  Recent efforts (e.g., Boehlje and Eidman) have expanded the control
topic within farm management to areas other than just accounting.  But this expansion and recent
work have shown that many of the financial measures may not be good predictors of financial
success, both within a year and between years.21
There is a need for a new set of control measures which can capture the essence of what
is happening concurrently and which are directly related to success at the end of the year.  This
"success" can be described generally as accomplishing a farmer's goals: profit maximization,
survival, debt reduction, etc.  The current set of control measures are mostly feedback mechanisms
measured at the end of a cycle.  The recent ABA Task Force on Financial Standards agreed upon
a set of consistently defined measures.  However, most of these are feedback, year-end measures.
Even the cash flow deviation statement may provide information too late--even though this
statement is extremely useful.
Furthermore, most financial performance measures provide little information about the
adequacy of financing decisions.  To be sure, they measure financial performance, but these
measures are typically at an enterprise or total farm level and reflect the totality of production,
marketing, and financial decisions.  Little information is available on how effectively the manager
has been in making financing decisions--i.e., negotiating interest rates and financing terms,
obtaining adequate equity from farm and nonfarm sources as well as debt from various lenders,
structuring repayment terms on capital purchases to adequately match asset cash flow, maintaining
adequate insurance and/or asset (cash or inventories) liquidity to meet unexpected contingencies,
negotiating real estate and capital asset leases and other methods of resource control.  As to leases
and other methods of asset control, even the overall financial performance measures are ambiguous
as to how such transactions are to be handled.
What farmers need is a new set of operational or concurrent financial control measures
which would provide a farm manager with early signals of the need to make management changes22
to cope with both internal and external deviations from the plan.  Ideally, these early control
signals would (1) provide enough time for corrective actions to be made within the production and
marketing phases, (2) indicate which areas of production and marketing need attention in the midst
of the cycle, and (3) measure separately performance in the financing, marketing, and production
functions.
The need for these new measures is also shown by two recent studies which evaluated
how well financial measures could predict success.  Tvedt, Olson, and Hawkins used beginning
financial measures and within year measures to explain the ending rate of return on assets.  Duarte
used a financial analysis expert system to combine three years of data to explain performance in
the fourth year.  Let us look at these two studies more closely.
Tvedt, Olson, and Hawkins (1989) looked at how well the ending rate of return on assets
(ROA) was explained by the traditional financial measures and other variables from the same year.
Data from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association for 1985 were
used for the initial analysis.  Data for 1986 and 1987 were used to verify the results from the 1985
data.  There were seven variables found to be significantly related to the rate of return on assets.
The number of acres farmed, corn yield (relative to county averages), asset turnover rate,
beginning debt-to-asset ratio, and dummy variables for cash rent and for beef finishing had a
positive correlation.  The gross ratio (i.e., total cash expenses divided by the value of production)
had a negative correlation.  The signs on these relationships are as expected except for the
beginning
debt-to-asset ratio.  This ratio was expected to have a negative effect but had a significant, positive23
     
1  This deviation from expected results may be due to two reasons.  First, rather than avoiding  
     farmers with high debt loads, creditors may allow farmers with high rates of return to borrow   
    more and, thus, raise their debt ratios.  Second, a few farmers under severe financial stress       
were not paying interest costs and, thus, their net income was overstated.
effect in all model specifications.
1  The adjusted R-squared for the regressions were
in the 0.55-0.63 range.
These seven significant variables were proxies for the general measures of size,
production efficiency, asset use efficiency, solvency, financial efficiency, enterprise selection, and
renting versus ownership.  One measure which is missing from this list is liquidity, a measure often
used in lending decisions.  In their study, the beginning current ratio was used as the liquidity
measure.  Liquidity's lack of significance may be due to its true lack of significance, the reliance
on borrowed operating capital instead of equity capital or the possibility that all the Association
farmers having sufficient liquidity levels so that it is not significant in explaining differences in this
group's rates of returns.
Duarte used the Texas A&M Agricultural Financial Analysis Expert System (AFAES)
to evaluate a panel of 50 farms from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management
Association in the years 1984-1987.  AFAES can estimate both a financial condition score based
on three or more years and an operating year score.  In one part of his work, Duarte evaluated the
ability of the financial condition score to predict the operating year score of the next year.  In the
first test, both the original financial condition scores and the rankings were significant but R-
squared values of .21 and .23, respectively, indicate that the financial condition score does not
contain sufficient information to explain next year's operating year score.24
In a second test, Duarte divided the 50 farms into three groups based on their 1986
financial score and found that the 1987 ranking based on operating scores were different between
the three groups.  However, using the Bonferroni multiple comparisons procedure, Duarte was
able to show that only the farms with the lowest 17 financial scores in 1986 had average operating
performances in 1987 that were worse than that for farms with the highest 17 financial scores in
1986.  That is, the highest and middle groups in 1986 were not statistically different in 1987 and
the middle and lowest groups in 1986 were not statistically different in 1987.  Only the highest and
lowest groups in 1986 stayed far enough apart in 1987 to show up significantly.  Thus, the ranking
based on the financial condition score in 1986 did provide some, but not sufficient, information
to explain the ranking based on 1987 operating scores.
In the third test, Duarte calculated a polychotomous logistic regression on the three
groups categorized by 1986 financial score to obtain confidence intervals for the different odds
ratios of moving between groups from 1986 to 1987.  These results were similar to those before--
the highest scoring farms in 1986 will likely be those which will have higher scores in 1987 and
the lowest in 1986 will most likely be lowest in 1987.  However, there was still a large portion of
unexplained movements between groups.
These two studies and general observations of the present and future economic
environment point to the need for new financial measures for operational and concurrent control.
Farmers need to know the impact of production, marketing, and financing decisions on financial
performance.  They need separate and unique performance measures that will reflect how well they
are making and implementing production, marketing, and financing decisions.  They also need to25
know the impact of changes in the external and internal financial environment and how they need
to adapt their production and marketing plans.  It is this latter need especially that calls for a new
set of concurrent financial control measures.
Conclusion
We have attempted to identify and review two concepts and two areas of work that may
contribute to a more complete understanding of the linkages between farm and financial
management.  The concepts recognize the importance of incorporating risk considerations and
financial dimensions in our traditional theory of the firm.  The areas of work we identify that merit
further analysis are strategies for resource control and financial measurement and control.  Our
judgment is that there still remains much to be done in understanding the farm and financial
management decision environment and the important role that planning, implementation, and
control play in that environment.26
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